European Journal of Law and Political Science
Vol 4 | Issue 1 | February 2025
ISSN 2796-1176

REVIEW

The Repercussions of the United States' Withdrawal from the International Iranian Nuclear Agreement

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ABSTRACT

This text explores Iran's willingness to enhance transparency and compliance with international nuclear regulations by agreeing to grant limited access to non-nuclear sites, particularly military facilities, for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors. The commitment is made within the framework of the Additional Protocol to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), showcasing Iran's dedication to implementing and ratifying international agreements.

One of the key provisions of Iran's commitment involves a substantial reduction in the number of centrifuges over ten years. The total number of centrifuges is set to decrease from 19,000 devices (including 10,200 currently operational) to 6,104. Furthermore, only 5,060 of these centrifuges will be authorized to produce uranium enriched at a rate not exceeding 3.67% for 15 years. Notably, all centrifuges used during this period will be of the first generation, emphasizing Iran's adherence to specified technological limitations.

This abstract provides an overview of Iran's multifaceted commitments, highlighting its efforts to address global concerns surrounding its nuclear program while operating within the stipulations of the Additional Protocol to the NPT ten years.

Keywords: Atomic bomb, International Atomic Energy Agency, International Treaty, nuclear power.

Submitted: December 26, 2024

Published: February 02, 2025

10.24018/ejpolitics.2025.4.1.137

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1. Introduction

Iran's announcement that it possesses nuclear capabilities that enable it to complete the nuclear fuel cycle was one of the challenges to which the response of countries in the world and the region differed. While countries whose foreign policy aligns with Iran welcomed this achievement, other countries, primarily the United States of America and European countries, opposed it, considering that such a development would lead to the rise of a nuclear weapons program that would upset the existing balances currently and in the future (Abadi, 1996, p. 25).

Iran's nuclear ambitions fueled fears, as the United States saw Iranian nuclear armament as a threat to its interests in the region and a threat to its allies. Therefore, it began adopting a policy of negotiations with Iran through the International Atomic Energy Agency and the European Troika on the one hand and using punitive policies against Iran unless it abandoned its nuclear project on the other hand.

This issue mixes the political, the legal, and the technical with the legacy of American-Iranian hostility, in addition to the fact that Iran represents a stumbling block to the American project to restructure the Middle East region.

The goals that prompted Iran to obtain nuclear capability were to confirm its defensive self-reliance, display the extent of scientific and technical progress it had achieved, confirm the success of the revolution that the Shah had not achieved, and stabilize and increase its regional influence by increasing military capabilities.

This has led to the creation of many crises and problems in the field of nuclear proliferation and has been linked to attempts by countries to obtain nuclear weapons and attempts by other countries to possess peaceful nuclear technology. However, those countries ultimately aim to possess nuclear weapons.

Although there are global institutions and agreements specialized in dealing with the nuclear issue, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Treaty on the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the United States, as a global power present on the international scene, has become somewhat responsible for nuclear developments in many regions, especially the East. The Middle East, in which the United States enjoys direction according to its policy.

The nuclear crisis is considered one of the most important crises related to nuclear proliferation issues, as it raises many problems and is controlled by many regional, international, and internal factors and determinants.

This crisis is considered the most complex of the crises of that stage. The specificity of this crisis is the extreme complexity associated with the nature of its parties, the mechanisms of its management, the theatre of its operations, the nature of the issues in dispute, and the characteristics of the strategic environment surrounding it. The United States has adopted several policies whose aim was to curb ambitions. The Iranian nuclear program is eliminated, and the Iranian nuclear file is used as an excuse to adopt several policies aimed at overthrowing the ruling regime in Iran, which is considered a strong opponent of American policies in the Middle East.

1.1. Research Importance

The nature of the Iranian nuclear file and the dangers that could result from it, in particular It is distinguished from other files in that it is based on many elements of doubt about intentions and few concrete and conclusively confirmed scientific facts and facts. This has expanded the scope of security controversy and political conflict in a region that has witnessed many crises and unrest that have been going on for more than decades between Iran and its neighbors in the region (the Gulf states and Israel), as well as with the major powers, especially the United States of America.

The pressures that this crisis and its management may pose on decision-makers in neighboring regional and international countries require the preparation of more scientific and academic studies on this crisis and how to manage it and benefit from it.

1.2. Research Methodology

The methodology used in this research involves the historical approach to study the historical situation of the Iranian nuclear file. The methodology also involves analyzing the nuclear crisis between Iran and the United States of America through international agreements.

1.3. Research Problem

Despite the presence of the IAEA and the UN, the United States has become the main actor in handling the Iranian nuclear issue, positioning itself as a defender of non-proliferation, human rights, and democracy. Since 2002, the U.S. has focused on managing the nuclear crisis, often disregarding international agreements. As a result, there are a set of questions raised, perhaps the most prominent of which are the following:

1. The nature of the development of the Iranian nuclear file.
2. How much is the impact of the United States' exit from the nuclear agreement.

1.4. Research Hypothesis

The study hypothesis is based on the vision that the Iranian nuclear file in the period after 2010 began to take a different direction, unlike what was the case in the nineties of the 20th century, as a result of the field visits of the International Atomic Energy Agency team and the production of enriched iodine in contrast to for international treaties.

1.5. Structure of the Study

The study was divided into two sections, in addition to the conclusion and conclusions. The first section, entitled The Origins of the Iranian Nuclear Program, was divided into two sections. In the first section, we shed light on the history of the Iranian nuclear program and in the second section, we try to reveal the development of the nuclear program after the. Islamic revolution.

The second section, entitled the Iranian nuclear file and international agreements, is divided into two requirements. The first requirement is that we focus on international agreements for nuclear programs. In the second requirement, we try to explain the repercussions of the United States' exit from the agreement concluded with Iran regarding this file, in addition to the conclusion and conclusion.

2. The Iranian Nuclear File and the Repercussions of the United States' Withdrawal from the International Agreement

2.1. The First Topic: The Origins of the Iranian Nuclear Program

The countries of the Middle East have no known interest in nuclear energy except in its military and security aspects for various reasons, including their natural richness in fossil energy sources, their lack of need for other types of energy due to their modest consumption on the one hand, and their weak awareness of environmental issues on the other hand, and the Israeli military interest in energy has also been interjected The region is in the midst of military nuclear competition between its countries. The Egyptians, Syrians, Libyans, Iraqis, and Iranians followed the Israeli interest in this aspect. The economic and peaceful interest in nuclear energy began late. As a result of the economic need to meet the accelerating growth in the need for civilian electrical consumption, especially in the Gulf states, Jordan, Egypt, and other countries, we will try to discuss the development of nuclear energy research and industry in Iran.

2.1.1. The First Requirement: The Iranian Nuclear Program, the Truth, and the Path

The efforts of the Iranian nuclear program to obtain nuclear energy go back to two different eras. The first began in 1957 AD and went to 1979 AD under the Shah's father-in-law, and the second was after the Islamic Revolution and still is. It was carried out within the framework of the Atoms for Peace program launched by US President David Eisenhower in the year 1953 AD, the signing of the first nuclear agreement between Iran and the United States in 1957 AD, when Tehran obtained the establishment of a center for nuclear research by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI; Abadi, 1996, p. 22) in the year 1967 AD and the centre was provided with a research reactor with a capacity of five megawatts. Iran signed a treaty Limiting the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)[1] in 1968 and ratified the treaty in 1970. However, after the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the Arabian Gulf region in the early seventies of the last century, the Shah of Iran began to look and aspire to the role of hegemon in the region and attempted to possess military nuclear energy. He approved. In the early seventies of the last century, a plan was to build 23 nuclear power plants by 2000 because oil would end. In 1975, an alliance that included Siemens and AEG signed an agreement worth 4–6 billion dollars to build a pressurized water reactor. It was completed in 1981 (Idris, 2006). The Swedish branch of the French company Eurodf also partnered with the Urano Cycle Company, known as Areva. French government formed a joint company with the Iranian government called Sofidifif for nuclear research and advanced nuclear industry, and in 1976, US President Ford issued a directive to provide Iran with the opportunity to purchase the management of a laboratory to extract plutonium from the remaining nuclear fuel from nuclear reactors. The West seems to be examining the Shah's efforts to build power. Nuclear weapons are a strong deterrent to Arab regimes that were classified as radical and anti-Western parties, such as Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Libya, Algeria...etc. In 1974, American intelligence assessed the situation, which said verbatim, "If the Shah remains alive and in power until the mid-eighties" (because of the confirmed information about his cancer). Moreover, if other countries (by which he meant Israel and India) were able to obtain nuclear weapons, Iran would undoubtedly follow suit) (Carlson, 2019, p. 102).

On the other hand, the Shah's government signed a contract worth $700 million to purchase 600 tons of so-called uranium yellowcake. From South Africa in 1976, this contract is considered a turning point in the nuclear program managed by the Shah because this "concentrated uranium" element is used to prepare fuel for nuclear reactors. However, it can also be enriched to manufacture a nuclear weapon. The United States did not object to the Shah's move, even though obtaining the yellow uranium is considered an interim step in producing "uranium hexafluoride," a gas that can feed an enrichment plant. According to the design of the centrifuges and the time cycle required for production, it is suitable for the resulting enriched uranium for use in a power plant or "to make a nuclear weapon."

This indicates that the Shah's ambitions did not stop at nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially since the stages of development of the nuclear program between the 1950s and 1970s were accompanied by huge political and military events in the region, through which the Shah sought To a greater position enabling him to gain political control over the Gulf region, especially under Western sponsorship and support. In addition, the Shah's government rapidly laid the practical foundations for achieving "nuclear weapons" in terms of technology. It is noted that the period of the 1970s, which is considered the turning point in the Iranian nuclear program in a way Increasingly, was accompanied by the entry of India and Pakistan (Iran's neighbors) into the club of countries that possess military nuclear technologies. This brings us back to statements quoted by the Shah that "Iran will abandon its self-restrictions on nuclear production if any country develops and produces nuclear weapons" (Abu Mughli, 1985, p. 139).

[1] NPT: the NPT non-nuclear-weapon states agree never to acquire nuclear weapons and the NPT nuclear-weapon states in exchange agree to share the benefits of peaceful treaty structure. For more information, see Carlson (2019).

2.1.2. The Second Requirement: The Development of the Iranian Nuclear Program after the 1979 Islamic Revolution

After the Iranian revolution in 1979, the nuclear program was suspended and did not completely end. This may be due, for example, to the international position on the new Islamic regime, which in turn led to the refusal of Western countries, especially the United States of America and Germany, to cooperate with Iran in the nuclear field, in addition to imposing an embargo. Comprehensively against Iran in all areas of armament. In 1986, Ayatollah Khomeini announced his country's commitment to continuing to develop its nuclear capabilities; within this framework, cooperation was undertaken with several Western countries (Abu Nasser, 2010, p. 19). Iran signed an agreement with Pakistan to cooperate in the military nuclear fields, and in 1987, another agreement was signed with Argentina and South Africa to obtain enriched uranium. The Isfahan Nuclear Research Center was also opened with French assistance. On this basis, a new phase of Iranian nuclear activity began, characterized by an almost complete cessation of international cooperation with it in this field on the one hand and the start of self-developed efforts for nuclear development on the other hand (Tawfiq, 1999, p. 109). This phase began with the decision of the Kraftwick Company. (It is the European party that signed Sovedev with Iran mentioned above) to cut off work at the Bushehr station (after completing 85% of the work on one of its reactors and 50% of the other reactor) under the pretext of Telco Iran paying the company's dues amounting to 450 million dollars, while it was said that the decision was taken under pressure. It was not announced, and the United States cut off the supply of highly enriched uranium to Iran. 1981 the government resumed nuclear activity, and work began at the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTEC) (Abdul Hadi, 2011, p. 36). The International Energy Organization was informed that the research was focused on uranium dioxide and that the purpose is the conversion of uranium trioxide (U3O8) into uranium dioxide-grade nuclear fuel (UO2) (Barth, 2016). In 1983, the International Atomic Energy Organization tried to help Iran in its research efforts, but the United States thwarted them. America stopped Chinese cooperation with Iran from building a uranium hexafluoride production plant in the same year. In 1984, German intelligence reported that Iran might obtain a nuclear bomb within two years due to its cooperation with Pakistan[2], and US Senator Alan Cranston also declared that Iran would be able to manufacture its bomb. Nuclear weapons within seven years (of course, Rafsanjani admitted in 2005 that Iran thought about producing nuclear weapons against Iraq during its war in the eighties of the last century; Fathi, 2006, p. 322). In 1985, Iran began to put pressure on France (by kidnapping the French hostages in Lebanon) to force it to reinstate its old nuclear agreements with the Shah. In 1986, Iran attacked France with terrorist attacks, and Georges Bisset, director of the Eurodev company, was assassinated. Investigations by journalists David Carbrown and Dominique Lorenz indicated that Iran was responsible for these attacks. In 1988, Prime Minister Jacques Chirac signed an agreement with Iran under which it agreed To return Iran's share in Eurodov and deliver enriched uranium without restrictions. The Argentine Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA) also signed an agreement with Iran in 1987 to finance a reactor from a high degree of uranium enrichment to a low degree of uranium enrichment at a rate of less than 20% and to transfer this fuel to Iran, but the United States succeeded. In stopping this cooperation as well (it was said that the terrorist attacks on Argentina during the 1990s were also Iranian pressure to restore its agreements with Argentina) (Barth, 2016).

Iranian Nuclear Activity in the 1990s

Since the beginning of the 1990s, Russia and Iran formed an organization called Persepolis (after the ancient Persian capital) to place Russian nuclear experts in Iran's service. This was with the approval of the head of Russian intelligence (SVR) Trubnikov, and this was only out of greed for profitable deals with Iran. At the time of Sovidef, by pumping an amount of $1.6 billion to reduce Iran's share of the company in return, in 1992, Iran invited the inspector of the International Energy Organization to visit all the sites it wanted to visit. The organization's director, Blix, acknowledged the number of Iranian nuclear projects (Abdul Hadi, 2011, pp. 47–49).

In the same year, Argentina decided to cancel an agreement worth $18 million to deliver a peaceful nuclear reactor to Iran due to American pressure. In 1995, Iran signed an agreement with Russia to resume work on the suspended Bushehr reactor and to build a VVER-1000 reactor to produce 915 megawatts, with work to be completed in the year 1996. In 1996, the Americans convinced China to withdraw from the project to build a nuclear station for Iran, even though China had completed drawing up the plans and Iran had obtained international approvals from the director of the Energy Organization at the time, Professor Mohamed ElBaradei (Porter, 2014, p. 310).

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[2] In 1987, it concluded two other agreements with the two countries in the field of exchange of experts, and Pakistan accordingly provided it with valuable nuclear assistance in the field of training Iranian scientists in enrichment research and the use of lasers in extracting plutonium in Kahuta laboratories, and it received Iranian scientists to conduct training at the Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology and the Institute of Pakistani Nuclear Studies. For more information, see المركز الديمقراطي العربي، "24 يوليو 2016، زينب خالد عبد المنعم السيد، الملف النووي الإيراني والمستقبل السياسي لمنطقة الشرق الأوسط (2003–2016). https://democraticac.de/?p=34549.

The Iranian Nuclear File in the 21st Century

At the beginning of the current century, the Iranian nuclear file turned into almost all major and regional countries. In 2002, the official spokesman for the national international crisis, when the world finally realized the truth about this file and what Iran was hiding about this issue, much more than what was announced. Thus, the file turned from a concern for the American administration into a hot file internationally. At the level of competent organizations, the Council of Resistance in Iran (opposition), Al-Rida Jafarzadeh revealed two nuclear sites under construction, one underground in Natanz and another for heavy water in Arak, and the International Energy Organization immediately called for an inspection. The two institutions and Iran's cooperation in exposing them, and Iran did not agree to that until the beginning of 2003 (Al-Barlouni, 2006, p. 93). After the invasion of Iraq, the United States of America rejected an Iranian offer to completely liquidate the nuclear file (and with-it Iran's support for Hezbollah and Hamas) in exchange for full normalization of relations with America, and then took France, Germany, and Britain took the initiative to resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis. In 2003, the Damascus Declaration was drawn up between the foreign ministers of the three countries with Iran, in which Iran voluntarily agreed to implement and sign a protocol with the International Energy Agency to build confidence and stop fuel enrichment during the negotiation period, but the IAEA, in a November 2003 report It acknowledged Iran's failure to adhere to its obligations, and the same applies to heavy water known as IR-40. After pressure from the European Union, Iran agreed to stop uranium enrichment for six months, then retracted its decision (Ismael, 2012). After the election of Ahmad Nejadi in 2005, Iran continued to play for time, especially during the years 2006 and 2007, with the threat from Iran's leaders that the nuclear program would not stop under any circumstances, regardless of the sanctions, and it is to serve peaceful purposes. Iran rejected a European offer to settle the issue in exchange for a pledge not to commit aggression from Europe against Iran, and Ali Larijani was appointed as chief negotiator for the Iranian side. In 2005, the European Union and America rejected Iran's proposal from Ahmadinejad for joint management of the nuclear file in 2006, after which most of the International Energy Organization Council voted to refer the file (Sayed, 2013)—Iran to the UN Security Council. In return, Iran stopped its voluntary cooperation with the organization. The same year, the Bush administration rejected ElBaradei's proposal to allow limited enrichment for Iran.

In April 2006, Ahmadinejad announced Iran's success in enriching uranium to a degree of 3.5%. In the same month, satellite images were revealed. Secret underground nuclear facilities in Natanz and Isfahan. Then, the Security Council issued Resolution No. 1737, imposing sanctions due to the nuclear and missile files in 2006. Then, eight other resolutions were issued against Iran until 2013. In 2015, the Director General of the Energy Organization (Amano) submitted a report on Iran's non-compliance. 2019, the organization acknowledged that Iran was still committed to the 2015 plan. However, it broke the agreement again and announced that it would enrich uranium to 5% at the Fordow Foundation, and after the killing of Qassem Soleimani, Iran abandoned all its obligations (NTI, n.d.; Sayed, 2013).

2.2. The Second Topic: The Effects of the United States' Withdrawal from the Nuclear Agreement

On July 14, 2015, after over a decade of negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany), a political agreement was reached. Although it was not signed or ratified, it was endorsed by the Security Council through Resolution 2231. Widely considered historic, the agreement aimed to address nuclear proliferation in the Middle East and ensure Iran's nuclear program remained peaceful. The agreement includes reducing Iranian nuclear activities in exchange for gradually lifting the economic sanctions imposed on Tehran.

2.2.1. The First Requirement: Texts of the International Nuclear Agreement with Iran

The Iranian nuclear program ended a rift and tension that lasted more than 36 years between the United States and the countries of the West in general, as it came after negotiations that lasted eighteen months in Geneva, Vienna, New York, and Lausanne. The Iranian regime received recognition that may quickly turn into the normalization of relations with Washington, and the agreement stipulates in its general principle To lift international sanctions on Iran in exchange for abandoning the military aspects of its nuclear program. While international parties welcomed it, other parties had reservations, and the Israeli Prime Minister described it as a historical mistake (Ahmed, 2022), as the agreement signed in 2015 stipulates that:

1. On reducing the number of centrifuges by two-thirds over a period of 10 years from 19,000 devices (including 10,200 devices operating now) to 6,104, of which only 5,060 devices will have the right to produce uranium enriched at a rate not exceeding 3.67% during a period of 15 years, and all the centrifuges that Iran will use during that period will be of the first generation (Arshid, 2015, p. 2).

2. The International Atomic Energy Agency is responsible for monitoring all Iranian nuclear sites on a regular basis, and IAEA inspectors have the right to monitor the entire Iranian nuclear network for 25 years.
3. Iran agreed to have IAEA inspectors have limited access to non-nuclear sites, especially military ones, if they have doubts, within the framework of the Additional Protocol to the Nuclear Non-Non-Proliferation Treaty, which Iran has committed to implementing and ratifying.
4. After implementing the terms of the agreement, the international sanctions imposed on 800 Iranian institutions and individuals, including the Central Bank of Iran and the Iranian National Oil Corporation, will be lifted, as well as the American and European sanctions and sanctions imposed under resolutions issued by the Security Council, immediately after the International Atomic Energy Agency confirms that Iran respects its commitments. These sanctions will be quickly re-imposed if the agreement is not implemented within 65 days (Arshid, 2015, p. 2).

The agreement entered into force in January 2016 under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and Iran achieved strategic gains from this agreement, the most important of which is preserving the infrastructure of its nuclear program, its right to enrich uranium, and continuing to conduct private research, within strict controls and monitoring conditions that are implemented. Considering its cancellation after 10 years of the essence of the Iranian nuclear agreement and what each party achieved from this agreement, as well as international recognition of the legitimacy of the Iranian regime, which it has lacked since Khomeini's revolution in 1979. It is also expected that the agreement will play a role in improving the situation of the faltering economy. As a result of sanctions in the oil field, which constitutes 80% of exports, the volume of Iranian exports may rise to 4 million barrels per day (Dargham, 2015).

The negatives are that, under this agreement, it has become a restricted country concerning the freedom to manage and conduct its peaceful nuclear program. The agreement would suspend approximately two-thirds of Iran's uranium enrichment capacity, in addition to transferring the enriched uranium to another country, namely Russia, for processing. Also, the sites Nuclear and some Iranian military sites are subject to international inspection at any time, and Iran is prohibited from establishing new enrichment sites for a period of 15 years, in addition to the continuation of US sanctions on terrorism (Arshid, 2015, p. 2).

Rouhani seeks such as the Revolutionary Guard, which may seek to obstruct Rouhani's efforts to implement his political program due to the negative repercussions imposed by the nuclear agreement on the interests of the Guard over the years. Specifically on the economic level, any comprehensive settlement would deprive the Revolutionary Guard of the gains it achieved due to the sanctions that reduced investments (Arab East Center for Civilizational and Strategic Studies, 2015).

From the perspective of the American administration, the nuclear deal could provide the Democrats with a significant accomplishment on the global stage as they approach the presidential elections. This accord endorses a fundamental principle of the Democrats in international affairs, emphasizing the value of negotiations to settle conflicts. The agreement is seen as a triumph for the American administration at a procedural level. Looking ahead to handling the Iranian nuclear dossier, apart from moving the United States away from the military option and its associated challenges, this agreement also secured a personal victory for President Obama, concluding his primary term with a historic achievement.

However, the Obama administration waived the basic condition that the president himself set in 2012 when he said that the agreement that we will accept with Iran must include an end to its nuclear program. However, the agreement does not stipulate the dismantling of a single Iranian facility, meaning that Iran maintains its nuclear structure, which may mean its transformation to nuclear power (Arab East Center for Civilizational and Strategic Studies, 2015).

On the other hand, the reactions of European countries were as follows: Britain welcomed the agreement, and its Foreign Minister Philip Hammond explained that "what we have achieved goes far beyond what many of us thought 18 months ago could be achieved and constitutes a good basis." In Paris, French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius said: Any nuclear agreement with Iran must be viewed by the region's countries as "tight" to avoid any attempt at nuclear proliferation in the future.

In New Delhi, the Indian Foreign Ministry expressed its welcome for reaching the framework agreement. Foreign Ministry spokesman Syed Akbaruddin said, "India always believes that the Iranian nuclear issue must be resolved peacefully by respecting Iran's right to use nuclear energy for peaceful needs while providing assurances to the international community that Iranian activities will remain purely peaceful."

As for Israel's position, many statements were issued by Israeli officials and leaders criticizing the agreement and describing it as a historical mistake. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu considered that the Lausanne agreement between Iran and the six countries paved the way for Tehran

to possess the atomic bomb and threatened Israel's survival. Netanyahu commented on signing the agreement. Stressing that the agreement is bad and has historical dimensions, he pledges that he will do everything he can to curb nuclear Iran (Abd, 2013, WWW.tahawolat.com).

The agreement sparked mixed reactions between supporters, conservatives, and opponents. However, the immediate interests related to the Middle East region are among the most important common interests between the countries of the world and Iran, which accelerated the nuclear agreement due to Iran's major role in the region, especially after the emergence of the terrorist organization ISIS and it became a country. The world is afraid, especially after this organization occupied lands in Iraq and Syria, and this is what forced them to deal with Iran because of its position on terrorism. As a field commander in the war against terrorist organizations, there has become an international conviction that the Middle East region is facing major shocks, and Iran is playing a fundamental role. In most areas where terrorism exists, it is possible in the future to rely on Iran alongside the traditional forces in the region in order to address the region's various crises, most notably confronting ISIS (Sajar, 2023, p. 97).

The great powers, especially Europe, other than the United States of America and Israel, played a long-term policy with Iran regarding its nuclear file, as they were keen to preserve their economic, political, and security interests, as these governments realized the importance of Iran to their economy. We note that the West followed Iran about this file with carrot and stick policy (Sajar, 2023, p. 99).

The nuclear agreement went through several stages of rejection and support. The difficulty of continuing the agreement with Iran without America on the part of European countries raises serious global concern if Tehran carries out its threat to return to seeking to enrich uranium to a level higher than the 3.5 percent permitted under the agreement, which means Openly launching a military nuclear arms race in a very sensitive spot in the world (Sajar, 2023, p. 103).

2.2.2. The Second Requirement: The Repercussions of the US Administration's Exit from the Agreement

Just as the signing of the nuclear agreement between Iran and the Group of Five plus Germany on July 14, 2015, was a historical event that was enshrined in UN Security Council Resolution No. 2231, US President Donald Trump has not hidden, since he was a candidate, his opposition to the nuclear agreement with Iran. He did not hide his resentment every time he was forced to postpone the US withdrawal from it and re-impose nuclear sanctions on Tehran. Trump postponed withdrawal from the nuclear agreement for the third time in January 2018 (Sajar, 2023, p. 99), but he stressed that this would be his last postponement. At that time, he put the US Congress and the United States' European allies in front of a "final opportunity" to "fix" what He described as "horrific flaws" in the nuclear agreement, or he would withdraw from it (Sajar, 2023, p. 103). The White House then specified conditions that must be included in any draft law that Congress is working on to overcome the "defects" in the 2015 nuclear agreement. It also called on the European allies to accept a separate "supplemental agreement" with Iran that addresses issues the agreement did not address. Nuclear power, such as Iran's ballistic missile program and its destabilizing activities in the region, put them in front of two choices: to stand with the United States or with the Iranian regime (Security Council, no. 2232).

America's withdrawal from the agreement restores America's official dealings with Iran as a rogue state or enemy, which thus restores the possibility of war with Iran, on its territory or in indirect territories such as Syria and Lebanon, through Israel and the rest of the allies in the region, as well as striking European commercial interests. As a result of the American withdrawal from the agreement poses enormous technical difficulties in the ability to implement European-Chinese-Russian-Turkish deals with Iran because the world's continued commercial and financial dealings with Iran and with the United States at the same time are not guaranteed by American sanctions, which may be imposed on those who Continues deals with Iran, as institutions, individuals and countries. Here, the next stage appears to be entitled an American-European political and economic confrontation against the backdrop of the American decision, and here, the cards, interactions, and blocs between the players have been shuffled again, just as everything in political science is not fixed but is constantly changing according to several factors (Habla, 2018).

How did the rest of the players confront the American decision? After America left the agreement and did not give Trump an alternative to the nuclear agreement when he announced his exit from it, he rather rushed American companies to end their contracts with Iran within only 90 to 180 days, even though the aforementioned agreement contains provisions that do not allow any party to exit the treaty before 45 days. From the date of issuance of the withdrawal decision, under the agreement negotiated for 12 years, a party that believes that another party is no longer fulfilling its obligations can initiate a dispute settlement mechanism within 45 days. This body, which can meet at the ministerial level, should give its opinion. The Iranian Foreign Minister has already hinted that Tehran could activate this option. Here, we return to talking about the extent of the obligation of the relevant international

administration and whether it is possible to simply cancel and freeze its effects. The European Union expressed deep regret over Trump's announcement of exit from the agreement, including Macron, the French President Angela Merkel, and others. On the other hand, US Secretary of Defense James Mattis said that the United States will continue With its allies to ensure that Iran does not obtain a nuclear weapon and to confront Iran's malign influence (Habla, 2018).

The withdraw from the agreement may push Iran to accelerate its efforts to relaunch its military nuclear program and strengthen the position of hard-liners in Tehran who were skeptical of the agreement from the beginning, at the expense of the reformists.

On the other hand, the International Atomic Energy Agency reports that since July 1, 2019, that is, since the United States left the nuclear file, Iran's response to this was that Iran has successively exceeded the permissible limit for the stock of low-enriched uranium and the enrichment rate allowed under both the agreement. It evaded restrictions imposed on research and development activities and resumed enrichment activities at the Fordow facility before abandoning the last operational element of the restrictions as of January 2020. Iran now stores uranium enriched to 60% and has also begun the production of uranium metal. These two activities represent an important stage in the development of nuclear weapons that is not justified by any credible civilian need. In parallel, Iran has significantly reduced the possibility of IAEA inspection of its stockpile as of February 23, 2021, by ceasing to apply the verification and follow-up measures stipulated in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and the Additional Protocol to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement that it concluded, which is The arrival of a new US administration to power in January 2021 supports the United States' compliance again with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, an important turning point in our efforts to preserve the agreement, and US President Joe Biden has expressed very clearly since assuming the US presidency his support for the negotiations aimed at The United States of America will rejoin the agreement, as soon as Iran recommits to fully and fully implementing its nuclear obligations under the agreement. In this new context, on April 2, 2021, negotiations on mandate compliance with the agency began (Reuters, 2018).

The International Atomic Energy Agency said in its quarterly report on the position of member states on nuclear activities that it found uranium particles enriched by 83.7% in samples taken from the Fordow reactor late last January (26).

Iran insists that its nuclear program activities are peaceful. However, energy experts warn that its repeated violations of the terms of the historic nuclear agreement shorten the time it needs to obtain quantities of enriched uranium suitable for developing nuclear weapons.

In our opinion, Iran is going to possess nuclear weapons. If Iran wanted nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, we would see the use of nuclear reactors in the fields of energy production, knowing that Iran only used hydrocarbon energy (oil and gas), but enrichment increased to 83.3%. Evidence that Iran wants to acquire nuclear weapons, and in the end, Iran will detonate an experimental nuclear weapon and put the international community before a fait accompli, as India and Pakistan did.

3. Conclusions

Iran is one of the countries that has large and deep strategic components that qualify it to address its regional strategic performance as a comprehensive power that participates in formulating the security and geopolitical balances in an effective and influential manner. For the Iranian strategy, the Middle East is a dominant environment for imposing the Iranian will and for Iran to present its Persian nationalist project infused with sectarian ideological overtones. This is due to the absence of the Arab project in addition to the entry of the sectarian factor as a new factor in polarization after 2003 AD.

In its regional project, Iran relies heavily on a number of geographical, ideological, and security foundations to manage its strategic expansion in the Middle East. Throughout the years that followed 2003, Iran worked to directly link countries and movements that are ideologically close to Iran with its strategy, especially in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Egypt, Lebanon, and Bahrain. The Iranian nuclear file, which constitutes Iranian military capabilities, remains the ceiling of the Iranian strategic project towards the Middle East region. Iran's access to nuclear capabilities means that its strategy has reached its end, so Iran has worked to develop its nuclear program.

The data suggests that Washington and Tehran are moving toward a temporary or limited agreement driven by necessity, without the framework of the 2015 deal. However, this does not mean that an agreement is guaranteed. For example, the Vienna talks collapsed in March 2022 when it seemed the two sides had reached a "draft agreement." Unlike the Vienna talks, the current negotiations are not aimed at resurrecting the 2015 deal and bringing the U.S. back into it, but rather focus on imposing specific or temporary restrictions on Iran's nuclear program, as well as the release of detainees and frozen funds. In the light of this, we conclude that:

1. The Iranian American relations have been affected by the current changes in the Arab region, and the Iranian-American relations will witness some changes after the American withdrawal from the nuclear agreement, but they remain within the framework of implementing the containment policy.
2. Iran will face an escalation in economic sanctions and human rights and democracy issues.
3. Iran has the capabilities to confront these pressures, which make the option of a military confrontation between the two countries remote at present.
4. The repercussions of the American withdrawal from the nuclear agreement with Iran cannot be denied. Its effects internally, regionally, and internationally, as well as the transformations brought about by this withdrawal, remain important because of the repercussions caused, whether inside Iran or at the external level.
5. The future of Iranian-American relations determines not only the future directions of the two countries but also the future directions of many regional countries and even some global countries whose future directions are somewhat affected by these Iranian relations.
6. Iran's repeated violation of the terms of the nuclear agreement shortens the time it needs to obtain quantities of enriched uranium suitable for developing nuclear weapons and how to reach it.

Conflict of Interest

The author declares that there is no conflict of interest.

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