

The Thrill of Victory and the Agony of Defeat: The First and Last One Hundred Days of a New and Old Administration

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ABSTRACT

Ghana has had general elections in 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016, and 2020. The next one is in 2024. Each administration comes with changes that are said to be inspired by ‘patrimonialism’ and ‘neopatrimonialism’. Objective: I reviewed how the successive political administrations of the National Democratic Congress and the New Patriotic Party have conducted their transitions to determine whether those actions were guided by principles of equity or patrimonialism/neopatrimonialism. Method: I conducted extensive literature review about the conduct of the administrations in the first and last one hundred days to ascertain the approach used and the results each of the political parties created to determine if those measures were in consonance with the Constitutional provisions on human security and political transition. Result: The first 100 days of the incoming administration is full of joy and celebrations; interspaced with the inalienation of some of the winning party’s members with unmet needs. The review showed how appointees of the previous administration are disenfranchised or re-assigned to remote workstations. The typical Ghanaian President does not introduce laudable, economic transformative agenda but he is pre-occupied with reprisals against the appointees of the previous government. Conclusion: The first one hundred days offers the ‘thrill of victory and the agony of defeat’¹. New cases of post-traumatic stress disorders associated with loss of relevance and social status emerge. The outgoing Presidents overburden the system with operational cost for new programs initiated in the eleventh hour of their departures.

Keywords: First and Last 100 Days, Neo-Patrimonialism, Patrimonialism, PTSD, Unmet Needs.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Ghana has had general elections in 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and the next one is in 2024. Each one of these sets of victory-and-defeat episodes is cloaked with hope for the political party that has won power and intense fear, nightmares and sleeplessness for those that have benefited duly or unduly from the party that has just lost power. The first one hundred days after elections, when the new government is sworn-in, is truly a moment of “thrill of victory and the agony of defeat”. Some losing adult party members weep like babies in their political cribs for the loss of relevance and access to wealth and good incomes, while others jubilate with a new sense of purpose and the certainty of good fortune to come. Each new administration comes with changes that are inspired by ‘patrimonialism’ and ‘neopatrimonialism’, identity politics, and a plan of action for reprisals and revenge against, sometimes, identifiable members of the other political party under the plume of white talcum powder of the jubilant. The first one hundred days is hardly about transformative agenda with respect to the development of the nation and has been so since the dawn of multi-party democracy in Ghana which may explain the economic retrogression of Ghana and nations like it into huge debt profiles. The current external debt stock of Ghana is to reach 98.7% of GDP by the end of 2023 (IMF, 2023a). The IMF Executive Board approved on May 17th, 2023, a 36-month Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement for Ghana, “to restore macroeconomic stability”, “ensure debt sustainability”, and “to lay the foundation for higher and more inclusive growth” (IMF, 2023b). The parochial actions of the apportionment of the wealth of the nation to party supporters, president’s relatives and family and friends, punishment for the remnants of the previous government still in office, cause a great deal of injuries to the spirit and essence of democracy, macroeconomic stability, at least in Ghana, because some of such actions negatively impact many of the appointees and their cohort of party members belonging to the old administration with Machiavellian brutality and, with high doses of

narcissism and psychopathy. On December 7th, 2024, Ghana goes to the polls to elect a new President and a new set of parliamentarians. If the pre-election brinkmanship displayed by the political parties throughout 2022 to the present is an Early Warning of what is to come, the stacks are not only high, but the cleavages between the political parties' contestants would have widened beyond mending. Both parties have been trading politically and personally nuanced insults and mudslinging with focused intensities devoid of social sensibilities and etiquette, but without really articulating what each will do for the nation if they win power (Bentil & Aidoo, 2018, pp. 7-10). By the close of business day on January 6th, 2025, for Parliamentarians and 7th January 2025, for the Presidency, a new "Establishment Order" would have been installed, and the honeymoon for the new administration would have begun in earnest. In a mature democracy (euphemism for civilized political conduct in electioneering and transition of administrations) the new President would announce a series of transformative agendas to take their nations to a more prosperous future. Not so in Ghana. Ghana would be in a brand new administrative and governance bag, where new Ministers of State and their deputies, CEOs of State institutions and agencies would be installed to ensure the patrimonial and neo-patrimonial allocation of Ghana's resources. Aided by an inquisitive and sensation-driven media, the country would be full of noise, jubilations, mourners, accusation of corruption and counter accusations for embezzlement, new appointments and dismissals. There would be demotion or posting to remote areas of most of those the previous government promoted on patrimonial, or identity politics basis in the last eighteen months to December 5th, 2024, to higher positions but without merit. Some political commentators in Ghana call this period, "injury time" where previous appointments are rescinded, or appointees are demoted or forced to resign and, or re-assigned to non-existent positions in other ministries and other offices. There would be a new cycle of biometric verification for public service workers in order to flush out ghost names from the payroll and even verification and authentication of certificates and university diplomas for those with questionable credentials. Questions would be raised about government expenditures in the last twelve months to December 5th, 2024 and government vehicles, those with V8 engines will be stolen, appropriated both by the outgoing and incoming administration staff. In all this, Ghana would be the loser and the politicians would walk into their banks to collect their new emoluments, allowances and brand new V8 vehicles, or drive off also into the sunset in their old V8 vehicles with their Ex-Gratia golden parachutes, as the case may be. This admonition is to raise the specter of danger, a harbinger piece that the nation should prepare better for political transitions at the front and tail ends of the Political Business Cycle to avoid the manifestation of hate, even post-election violence, acts of sabotage and post-traumatic stress disorders, (PSTD) associated with personal losses.

II. THE BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED DAYS

Many writers, researchers, and American historians have written about the first one hundred days of American Presidents but not so much about the performances of African Presidents. Examples of such exemplary works are James MacGregor Burns' biography, *"Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox"* (1945), Jonathan Alter's *"Defining Moment: FDR's Hundred Days and the Triumph of Hope"* (2006), and Anthony Lewis' *"Kennedy's First 100 Days: Gain at Home, Loss Abroad"* (1961). Political scientists have also provided extensive literature on the origin of the first 100 days as a tool for performance evaluation of a new president in the United States of America. This concept has now been mainstreamed into many democracies as a time-honored gauge to the future. Among the various dossiers on the subject, I have chosen that of a Senior Fellow from the Center for Effective Public Management, Kamarck's (2021) piece on *"The first 100 days: When did we start caring about them and why do they matter?"* because it provides the history and the justification for the concept apart from being brief. We have learned from Kamarck that the concept came from the presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt who is affectionately referred to as FDR and, who replaced President Herbert Hoover on March 4th, 1933. This was in the middle of the Great Depression, a period in history that required bold actions economically, politically, and socially in order to relieve the suffering of the American people.

The economic conditions in the 1930's in America were, perhaps, like the current economic conditions of many of the nations in Sub-Saharan Africa, if not worse, with high unemployment, crime, poverty, underdevelopment, stagnated national manufacturing industries and civil-military complex that was floundering for purpose and markets. With the exception of South Africa, Egypt and to a limited extent, Namibia, African nations do not have well-functioning civil-military-industrial-complexes. Some of these nations' leaders are too intellectually challenged or parochial to think of investing in commercial industries, let alone civil-military-industrial complexes.

Kamarck reports that FDR's inaugural speech is memorable for reassuring the American public that, "we have nothing to fear but fear itself". He subsequently informed the American people the challenges of the nation and how he was going to fix them from the second week of his presidency. From then on, and on a weekly basis, he rendered accounts to the public of the milestones he had achieved in that short time.

During the first one hundred days in office, Roosevelt introduced bold and new policies, legislation and regulations which restored the confidence of the commercial and investment classes, as well as the American consumer with programs such as taking off the American dollar from the gold standard, legislation for farmers and homeowners support and access to capital, introduced social welfare support for the unemployed, and “passed amendments to the Volstead Act¹, which had created prohibition against the sale of beer and alcohol” (Kamarck, 2021, p. 2).

She concludes her piece after reporting on the public expectations with other presidents such as Ronald Reagan, Jimmy Carter, George Bush Jnr., and Obama that, “a president’s first 100 days is by no means the definitive judgment on his administration, but the legacy of Roosevelt means that the press continues to pay attention to it and so do we”. The assessment will review that “there are some things that turn out to not matter and some that may predict what will matter. Figuring out which is which is the challenge”.

III. BEST INTERNATIONAL PRACTICES: EXPECTED DELIVERABLES IN THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED DAYS

The effort of FDR to salvage his country from economic ruins has provided us with these values: *first*, a new President ought to be transparent with the public about the economic situation of the nation without engaging in the blaming game. *Second*, he must identify the problems that confront the economy and provide immediate and realistic solutions to them. *Third*, he must provide tax relief, incentivize the manufacturing and industrial segment of the economy and, *fourth*, provide programs for the welfare of the people with economic and social safety nets. *Fifth*, he must launch infrastructural development programs (not slogans and intentions) that benefit everyone but not a project to “glorify the President’s God for helping him to win power” irrespective of whether the hand of the devil was in the mix of his winning power, as President Akufo Addo’s failed “national cathedral project” was promoted to be in 2017, within a year after he became President of Ghana on January 7th, 2017. *Sixth*, in fact, the first one hundred days of the President in Ghana or anywhere in Africa, is not about the re-distribution of the wealth and income of the nation on patrimonial and neopatrimonial lines, with high doses of insular identity politics, tribal and political party politics, but programs that are egalitarian in nature within the rule of law, guided by ethical values of categorical imperative, justice and fairness. These are the capstone activities which the public and the voter expect to see, and which could ultimately change the lives of the majority of the people.

The reverse of these values is what Ghanaian Presidents of all political persuasions are wont of doing, which puts them in sub-standard class as leaders compared to the Presidents of the mature democracies and economies as discussed and would be discussed.

A. *Patrimonialism and How it is Understood by Researchers with Respect to Africa*

As it is in life, so it is in academic research with variety of opinions on a phenomenon. Patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism have many definitions, none superior to the other, each valid in their focus and goals. Ana Huertas Francisco (2010) defines “neopatrimonialism as a vertical distribution of resources that give rise to patron-client network based around a powerful individual or political party”. She adds that, “neopatrimonialism was once argued to be necessary for unification and development after decolonization” where the native-led establishment order replaced the colonial system. Nonetheless, she concludes, it is an “impediment that prevents African societies from evolving from their primary export economies (Darnton, 1994, as cited in Huertas Francisco, 2010, p. 1).

Another view is from Pitcher *et al.* (2009), where they state that neopatrimonialism promotes clientelism over meritocracy while others have described it as a form of corruption. Weber (1947), the creator of the concept, did not see it that way. He argued that it was not synonymous with corruption, bad government, violence, or evidence of weak governance system but a different way for the states to gain legitimacy in tackling difficult economic and developmental issues. In Weber’s view, patrimonialism was best when its reciprocal essence was exhibited between the ruled and the ruler and where under such a system the subjects are able to check the actions of the ruler and ruler those of the citizens.

Erdmann and Engel (2006) defined patrimonialism as a derivation from Weber’s concepts of patrimonialism and legal-rational bureaucracy (Weber, 1978, p. 217).

¹ The Emergency Banking Act (March, 1933); Cullen-Harrison Act (March 16) modifying the Volstead Act; Economy Act (March 20); Civilian Conservation Corps (March 31); Federal Emergency Relief Act (May 12); Agricultural Adjustment Act (May 12); Emergency Farm Mortgage Act (May 12); Tennessee Valley Authority (May 18). FDR urged Congress to pass 77 laws during his first 100 days, many of which were directed towards reviving the economy of the United States through various public works projects. The hundredth day of his presidency was on June 12, 1933. In a radio broadcast on July 1933, the President said “we all wanted the opportunity of a little quiet though to examine and assimilate in a mental picture the crowding events of the hundred days which had been devoted to the starting of the wheels of the New Deal”. Since then, the first one hundred days of a presidential term as taken on a completely new character and used as benchmark to measure presidential performance.

They stated that,

Neopatrimonialism is a mixture of two, partly interwoven, types of domination that co-exist: namely, patrimonial and legal-rational bureaucratic domination. Under patrimonialism, all power relations between ruler and ruled, political as well as administrative relations, are personal relations; there is no differentiation between the private and the public realm. However, under neopatrimonialism the distinction between the private and the public, at least formally, exists and is accepted, and public reference can be made to this distinction (it is a different matter whether this is observed or not). Neopatrimonial rule takes place within the framework of, and with the claim to, legal-rational bureaucracy or “modern” state-ness. Formal structures and rules do exist, although in practice, the separation of the private and public sphere is not always observed. In other words, two systems exist next to each other, the patrimonial of the personal relations, and the legal rational of the bureaucracy (Erdmann & Engel, 2006, pp. 17-18).

This definition has not cleared the confusion in the application of the term patrimonialism prior to its evolution to neopatrimonialism under Eisenstadt (1973). Erdmann and Engel’s definition seems convoluted at best. By the constitutional provisions in Ghana, in fact the system is packed in favor of patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism, where attempts at differentiation lead to more confusion. For example, under the 1992 Constitution of Ghana, all power relating to the hire, appointment and retention of personnel for critical national assets management is vested in the Presidency and may be devolved by delegation to other subordinate entities (Articles 58 (2-3); 70, 71 of the 1992 Constitution). This comes closely to the understanding or the mundane definition of patrimonialism as all power flowing from the ruler, and that there is no distinction between the public and private domains, again, since the government is the biggest employer, making the President the Chief-Distributor-of-employment-wealth and income.

If in exercising this mandate, the selection process was based on meritocracy and pragmatism, none would have raised any issue but where the President, as it was seen in Ghana under President Akufo Addo where a large number of his relatives were considered qualified for many public jobs above everyone else, then such actions cannot be attributable to patrimonialism per se, but to the egoism and selfish nature of the man who made such a situation possible. In fact, Article 34 (1) prohibits the unqualified and selfish interpretation of the laws of Ghana with this provision:

The Directive Principles of State Policy contained in this Chapter (Six) shall guide all citizens, Parliament, the President, the Judiciary, the Council of State, the Cabinet, political parties and other bodies and persons in applying or interpreting this Constitution or any other law and in taking and implementing any policy decisions, for the establishment of a just and free society.

Patrimonialism gets bad publicity because it appears the researchers who have promoted the concept as the bane of Africa’s lack of development and political freedoms are themselves confused about democracy which was never meant to be proportional application of freedom or equity and equality. Neither has Athenian democracy nor modern democracy under constitutional rule managed to remove disproportionalism, discriminatory and social exclusion out of society. We still live in a system, where the elite members of society rule over those under economic-indentured servitude, the poor majority and underclassness. Today, inequality of persons under constitutional democracies is not being enforced politically for the most part but rather economically also for the most part. The places and access Dangote has in the world cannot be quantified against the access or privileges the best brain surgeon in Nigeria or in the world can gain, irrespective of race, due to Dangote’s wealth. By the quick application of the concept of patrimonialism, it appears some researchers have not really understood too well, Max Weber’s patrimonialism and managed to create or concoct conclusions which Pitcher *et al.* (2009) have systematized as follows:

- Patrimonialism has been established as the characteristic form of governance in Africa producing a kind of African Exceptionalism in the political science literature.
- Failure of African democracy and citizen action have been ascribed to patrimonialism precluding other sources.
- Patrimonialism as a key explanation for poor economic performance, creating a convenient catch-all for Africa’s ills.

This is counter to Weberian understanding of patrimonialism as being reciprocity between the ruler and the ruled, which is consistent with modern form of constitutional rule, and the basic tenets of the rule of law, although constitutional rule was not possibly what Weber had in mind in articulating his thesis (Weber, 1922, pp. 173-175, as cited in von Soest, 2021, p. 4).

In “*Economy and Society*”, Max Weber (1864-1920) discussed two primary political concepts of ‘domination’ and ‘legitimacy’. According to the kind of claim of “legitimacy” an entity or a person has, he established three types of domination, namely, legal, traditional and charismatic. Under the Traditional authority of domination, “obedience is owed not to the enacted rules but to the person who occupies a position of authority by tradition or who has been chosen for it by traditional master (Weber, 1978, p. 227, as cited in Erdmann & Engel, 2006, p. 8). This meant that, even in a democracy, there are fringes of democracy that do not mind the substantive law as valid all the time, but the validity of the substantive law

may be inferred from the policy interpretation of the ruler. This articulation appears to be a reasonable way to allow the ruler to make decisions with flexibility for the benefit of the ruled, in as much as the ruler is not despotic and arbitrary in his administration. Does this nuance to Weber's patrimonialism make sense? Eisenstadt says yes, it does but subject to a few modifications, hence neopatrimonialism.

Eisenstadt (1973) argues that charismatic leadership in the political space is inappropriate even in Africa. Instead, the focus is on patrimonialism as a tool for accelerated modernization and national development in Sub-Saharan Africa. He offered that patrimonialism is closely related to clientelism, political party patronage and thus developed his concept of neopatrimonialism. Neopatrimonialism symbolized Africa's persistent economic crisis (van de Walle, 2001, *as cited in* Erdmann & Engel, 2006, p. 8). With the addition or modification of Eisenstadt to Weber's design, the discourse on patrimonialism got muddled. Patrimonialism per Theobald (1982, p. 555) meant, "social capital" or as a way of explaining political cohesion in African societies, but "today", neopatrimonialism "poses a functional threat to the peaceful political development of African States and development in general". Roth (1968, p. 18) countered that, the personification of neopatrimonialism is a synonym for "personal rulership" or "particularistic personal rulership", as distinguished from "universal personalism" which prevails in the western economies. He furthered his argument that, "personal rulership" operates "on the basis of loyalties that do not require any belief in the ruler's unique personal qualifications but are inextricably linked to material incentives and rewards (Roth, 1978, p. 196, *as cited in* Erdmann & Engel, 2006, p. 9).

Erdmann and Engel's apologia on neopatrimonialism in Africa is concerning precisely because the distribution of the national wealth and income is dominated by identity politics, partisan and ethnic considerations as well as consanguinity. They write that, "understanding of politics in Africa which depicts all official relations as privatized or *modus operandi*, as being essentially informal does not reflect African realities". This is because, they claim. "It is a daily experience that not all political and administrative decisions are taken according to informal rules determine by private or personal gusto". That, "the distribution of jobs, administrative careers as well as credits and licenses also exercised according to fixed procedures, rules and language that follows the formal procedures of a legal rationality". Really?

Gero Erdmann and Ulf Engel's paper: "*Neopatrimonialism Revisited – Beyond a Catch-All Concept*" (2006), attempted to explain and correct the misapplication of "neopatrimonialism based on Weber's original concept and explanation of patrimonialism and legal-rational bureaucracy" to bring back the intended original interpretation of the concept, perhaps, away from the alleged bastardization of the term by African researchers and scholars, such as Bratton and van de Wall (1997), Erdmann (2002), Engelbert (2000), and Chabal and Daloz (1999). Erdmann and Engel (2006) wanted to tackle the "uncritical" and "affirmative" uses of the concept (...). They quoted Theobald (1982, pp. 554, 555) that, "rather than isolating a socio-political phenomenon, it tends to gloss over substantial differences (...) and has become something of a catch-all concept in danger of losing its analytical utility."

Some other researchers like Olukoshi (1998, p. 14) "repudiate the concept fundamentally", that "it is part of the neo-liberal project" as an ideological justification for the (...) onslaught on the State (*as cited in* Erdmann & Engel, 2006, p. 6). From here on, I summarize the outcome of the literature review of the concept and how it is being applied by the political parties in Ghana, knowingly or unknowingly.

IV. OUTCOMES OF THE LITERATURE REVIEW AND DOCUMENTARY CONTENT ANALYSIS

A. *Best National Practices: Initial Deliverables in the Last 100 Days*

I have chosen to focus on the last one hundred days as a start to this portion in the life of the outgoing President and political party in government because it creates a "cause and effect" conundrum. The result is a wicked but, perhaps, strategic misdirection of the attentions of the incoming President from focusing on nation-building to settling of scores, initiating reprisals, vengeance, retaliatory measures and parochialism all of which undermine objective performance of the Ghanaian or African Presidents. These machinations cast them as immature, vindictive, and clueless.

Addadzi-Koom (2021, pp. 25-30) in her paper, "*Midnight Actions during Presidential Transition of Ghana: A Rising Time*", stated that in the final days of President John Agyekum Kufuor's term in 2009, "he approved the Single Spine Salary Scheme which increased public and civil sector salaries". The incoming political party was the National Democratic Congress that was saddled with how to find the additional revenue to pay the higher salaries. As direct reprisal for what the New Patriotic Party's leader Kufuor did in 2009 (just before Kufuor left office on January 6th, 2009 (at 11:59:59 o'clock in the night). In "2016, the outgoing President John Dramani Mahama embarked on a spree of midnight actions – increasing salaries of National Service personnel, making multiple appointments and recruitment, cutting sod for projects and signing a number of contracts" without regard to funding. Such activities by both political parties' leader of government should have happened in the first one hundred days to have a reverberating effect on the population but it appeared subterfuge was more a rewarding feat than outright

initiation of programs with universal appeals and benefits. It is obvious that not all the Ghanaian Presidents have the best interest of Ghana at all times, and the last one hundred days, epitomizes this assertion more vividly than in any other period in the lives of a President. That is to say, in the case of Ghana, the first one hundred days have flipside which is significantly influenced by the last 100 days of the just defeated government.

Ghana has a Transition Act of 2012 (Act 845) which was designed to moderate the switch from one outgoing administration and usher in the in-coming administration smoothly. Despite the provisions of the Transition Act of 2012, the outgoing Presidents, even Ministers of State, Chief Executive Officers of public companies and other state institutions are wont of appointing, promoting and elevating members of their political parties, normally the ruling party, to positions of authority before going home (Addadzi-Koom, 2021; Gyampo *et al.*, 2013). They are wont of gifting state assets such as vehicles, plots of government lands, government buildings and other movable and immovable assets to their girlfriends, boyfriends, family members and business associates and party big wigs or sell them off without public tender at throw away prices.

When it comes to new appointments, some of such appointments and promotions are given to qualified personnel but the overwhelming majority of the newly and hastily promoted or appointed staff, are merely chaff on the vast arena of the bureaucratic wheat field in terms of experience, core competencies, educational achievement, and years of service. The new administration and Presidency in the first 100 days habitually reverses such appointments either by demotion, re-allocation of the affected personnel to remote stations of the nation but without specific job or duty assignment, taxonomy, performance objective or even contract of engagement. The tit-for-tat manner of appointments and promotions by the out-going President and his Ministers against the sacking or demotion by the in-coming President and his Ministers is a “zero sum gain”. In Game Theory, zero sum gain is where one person’s gain, say the NPP operative in a well-paying job is pushed off, literally from his seat, and the position offered to another person belonging to the NDC where such a cycle of “push-off and install-another” continues every four years. In the last one hundred days of an outgoing government, for every person who gains promotion, or a contract is about 80% to 90% certain to lose it to a counter political party member whose government is in power. So why go for it?

Ghana’s Presidential Transition Act of 2012 has many weaknesses that ought to be amended (Gyampo *et al.*, 2013, pp. 1-4). Generally, the first one hundred days of a new Ghanaian President is where the initiation of political social distancing between the elected parliamentarians, government leaders and the public starts, and where a huge fire wall is erected around the Presidency and access is granted to a few privileged persons. In the political history and traditions of Ghana, the first one hundred days is where major re-distribution of wealth and income on patrimonial and neopatrimonial lenses are initiated. New appointments of Ministers, CEOs of government institutions, Board memberships of public entities such as universities, banks, insurance, and allied financial entities such as Customs and Excise, Revenue Service, Bank of Ghana, Commercial Bank, Agencies and Departments are made.

This period in the affairs of the nation is probably the most defining and dangerous period for political party members, supporters and operatives to become disgruntled and disillusioned or suffer alienation, depression and personal pain for being passed over, for being neglected in favor of another, allegedly, undeserving person, and rendered irrelevant by his or her own political party.

What many Ghanaian voters do not appreciate about their democracy is that appointments to high government offices and positions are “sold and bought” as part of fund-raising measure to finance the campaign, long before the elections and soon after the party primaries, where millions of money are “gambled” by the givers. The sums are given to the Flagbearer of a political party to prosecute the election related expenditure in hopes that when he wins power, the financial supporters (not the rah-rah-boys and girls in the streets, or the hardworking party executives at the district or community level) shall first be appointed to well-paying jobs. During this period, someone at the campaign headquarters is designated to also collect the Curriculum Vitae of those big donors and supporters for recognition when victory comes.

Such is not the kind of ‘reciprocity’ that the original conception of patrimonial relationship between the ruler and the ruled Weber (1946) articulated. His thesis did not envisage political campaign funding and therefore cannot be applied to the Ghanaian or African situation in the absence of campaign finance by government. Weber’s patrimonialism works in a pristine, law endowed economic system where the sources of campaign funding are transparent and closely monitored. Therefore, for every new Chief Executive Officer or high ranking official even at the ministries such as Directors, even Deputy Directors that one sees on television or in the newspapers in the new government, it is fair to assume (controlling for consanguinity, prior sexual or business relationship and long-serving national party executive) that, such a person made huge financial contributions to the campaign finances of the political party in power which was the purchase price of the position he occupies. The pragmatic side of patrimonialism as practiced in the corridors of political party-in-government-offices is that it is not an abstract or a providential

development but that each position is carefully commoditized, then monetized, and with weighted value, denominated in thousands of Ghana Cedis to the highest bidder.

A study by the Center for Democratic Development, CDD puts the cost of presidential campaign in Ghana at US\$ 100 million or (GHC 1,200,000,000), while parliamentary campaign costs US\$ 693,000 or (GHC 8,316,000) as of 2022 (<https://citinewsroom.com-2022/02>). The average presidential candidate in Ghana even at conservative calculation would need not less than 12,000 capable contributors to give up GHC 100,000.00 each in order to make up the total needs of GHC 1.2 billion. Thus, if a supporter gives let say, GHC 300,000.00 in contribution, does such a person deserve to be “appointed” as Chief Executive Officer of a bank and at a potential salary of GHC 70,000.00 a month before taxes? Would such a deal be considered as reciprocal or something inimical to democracy? The fact that Ghana has been able during each of the political business cycle, to change government and presidents shows that there are more givers of political donations than receivers. This may explain the desire on the part of some greedy people to enter into the presidential political campaign circus as independent candidates.

Returning to the concept of patrimonialism in national politics, in order to achieve the goals of the redistribution drive of wealth and income, positions and appointments among members of the political party in power, the ‘personnel remnants’ of the previous political party ought to be discharged or re-assigned to nondescript positions ensconced in windowless corner offices. The national researchers who study post-election machinations of the political parties believe that the Presidential Transition Act of 2012 enacted to control excesses as exhibited by both the NPP and the NDC leaderships in 2009 and 2020, did not anticipate the increasing midnight actions (Addadzi-Koom, 2021, pp. 25-34).

Writing about the political business cycle and corruption in Africa as compared to the situation in the mature western economies, Iddrisu (2022, p. 3) noted that “in the advanced democracies, governments influence economic policies ahead of elections, resulting in the increment of fiscal deficits in election year which may lead to high inflation after election. Those studies on which Iddrisu relied on to discuss the political shenanigans of politicians even in the advanced economies are Nordhaus (1975), Tufte (1978), Reid (1998), Alesina *et al.* (1992), and Kohno and Nishizawa (1990). Those studies did not go far enough in their review of the machinations in the Political Business Cycle. It is reasonable to assume that it is not only during the run-off to elections that politicians tweak economic policies ahead of elections but also during the transition period, post elections as we have seen in the case of Ghana (Iddrisu, 2022; Addadzi-Koom, 2021; Gyampo *et al.*, 2013).

B. Best National Practice: In the First 100 Days

From the foregoing, it is revealed that unlike what pertains in the Western economies, the main features of the activities of Ghana’s Presidents in the first one hundred days are, *first*, appointments of new Ministers, Metropolitan and Municipal as well as District Chief Executive Officers, and other such appointments. *Second*, the removal of political personnel remnants left over by the previous government and re-assigned into remote corners of the nation. *Third*, Constituting the Cabinet and keeping the nation running. *Fourth*, appointing more women into positions of authority, and engaging in political campaign rhetoric with the tendency to blame the previous administration for emptying government coffers before departing as well as *fifth*, complaining over bloated public service salaries and emoluments. Such activities are neither defining nor transformative.

TABLE I: 5 MOST IMPORTANT PRESIDENTIAL INITIATIVES IN THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED DAYS

Name	1 st Act	2 nd Act	3 rd Act	4 th Act	5 th Act
Kufuour (2000-2008)	Adopt HIPC, Deepen regionalism with state visits to Togo, Nigeria etc	Declaration on declaration of asset by end 2021	Call on Public Debate on salary structure	Stopped purchasing CFC based refrigerators	Mallam Issa probe ready, Disband ACDRs from Armed Forces, AG ending Criminal Libel suits of newspapers
Atta Mills (2009- July, 2012); Mahama (24 July 2012)	Appoints 76 Ministers, Deputies but no PAs to reduce spending	More women in government	Increased capitation grant	Provided 1.6 School Uniforms to deprived communities	Put a government in place
John Mahama (2012- 2016)	More women in government	Many more young people in government	Security Improvements	Resolute and Calm Leadership	Scaling the energy crisis
Akufo Addo (2017-2024)	Restoring fiscal discipline and Micro economic stability	Re-profiling Ghana’s public debt, Ghc2.2B up to 15 years at 19.7%	Mass boost to international reserve from \$6B to \$8B	Reduce inflation rate from 15.4% to 12.8%	Allocate \$1M in cedis to each District Assembly for development

From Table I, it is clear that the programs that Ghana’s Presidents enter into are not crucial initiatives for the economy. They are child’s play and tend to benefit a few individuals. Although some of the programs had universal and beneficial effects, the initiatives do not dramatically or significantly alter the fortunes of the majority of the people. It appears such initiatives could have been implemented over time and used the

first one hundred days of their respective presidencies to go after loftier goals with lasting impact on Ghanaian society, such as (i) the construction of a municipal waste treatment plant in each of the major cities, (ii) free school bus rides for school going children, (iii) reduced the cost of transportation and medication of those over sixty years of age, and (iv) maternity leave days for fathers, (v) a reduction of the lending rate for all first time home buyers, and (vi) reasonable commercial rates for business in the rural areas to attract young people back into the community and reduce the housing and other pressures in the cities.

The following discussions on the concept of patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism as intimate aspects of Ghana's public life and official decision-making tool with respect to appointments, national consciousness and conscience, normative ethics and morality and choices, would explain why the respective governments seem so attached to these concepts. The simple reason is that the governments are simply not capable of creating or revitalizing the national economies to increase production and manufacturing, or even enable private enterprise to become the engine of growth and innovation. The government is the main provider of jobs in Ghana and in many African nations, opportunities which invariably are financed by the taxpayers. The President then becomes the Chief Human Resource Manager who doles out jobs, vis-à-vis wealth and income to those who have pleased him by way of campaign contributions, and common political, tribal, ethnic, or professional identities. As a constitutionally designated Human Resource Manager, the President uses both delegated powers and actual as well as inherent powers in that office to make literally tens of hundreds of appointments. In this scenario, the Presidents together with their CEOs and other line managers are like spoilt brats in a candy store dishing out orioles cooks, M&Ms, peanut butter cookies, bizcochito, fortune candies, Graham crackers, snickerdoodle and ice crime. If he likes you, if you are a big spender, you get orioles or M&Ms or even chocolate chip cookies with ice cream on top, but if you are marginally likeable, or contribute so little to political campaigns, he gives you a piece of crackers but with no ice cream to top it. Some, the majority, whether they are political party members or not, get absolutely nothing due to their lack of proximity to the Presidency through prior financial contributions to the presidential aspirations and efforts.

C. *Patrimonialism-Neopatrimonialism and Impact on Development*

A number of researchers have come to the damning conclusion, though hastily, that both the original application of the concept of patrimonialism as articulated by Weber and as expanded by Eisenstadt (1973) have had a negative effect on Africa's development at all levels. Christian von Soest (2021) in his "*Neopatrimonialism: A critical Assessment*", described it as "a system of social hierarchy where government uses State resources to secure the loyalty of members of the population at all levels of society, a position supported by Bayart (1993), Bratton and van de Walle (1997), Chabal and Daloz (1998) and von Soest (2021). "It is a situation where formal state institutions are fused with informal (...) politics of rulers (von Soest, 2021, p. 1). But other researchers have condemned the position of Soest and others that, it is an inadequate empirical tool "for gaining insights into governance - in non-OECD states (de Grassi, 2008) and (Mkandawire, 2015).

D. *Nexus of "Winner-Takes-All-Politics" to Neopatrimonialism*

Some researchers attempt to identify the locus of Africa's or Ghana's underdevelopment by literally finger pointing one intellectual concept as the panacea or the culprit. They approach the allocation of the reasons for the economic challenges of Ghana or Africa from the point of view of double binary lenses, that if it is not attributable to patrimonialism or neopatrimonialism, then it ought to be due to either the "*Winner-Takes-All*" politics or the "*Adversarial Political System*" which Ghana or many of the nations in Africa practice under constitutional rule. That is to say, the constitution, just like the law, is an ass.

I will use two peer-reviewed papers to illustrate this observation. In Ransford Edward Van Gyampo's (2015) work, "*Dealing with Ghana's Winner-Takes-All Politics: A case for Proportional Representation?*" he considered the marginalization of perceived political opponents and the feelings of exclusion from the governance processes of those who do not belong to the government or the ruling party. According to Gyampo, the negative effects of such an action, if in fact it happened in reality, includes disincentives to national development, loss of social cohesion and undermines democracy. The paper recommended "proportional representation" as a panacea against Winner-Takes-All Politics in Ghana. Yet, Gyampo admitted that "the 1992 Constitution prescribes an arrangement for competition which leans on Winner-Takes-All as a formula for the selection of leaders. In my humble view, the Winner-Takes-All provision in the constitution is not meant only for the selection of leaders but the entire support staff that gives full faith and credit to the performative services of the leader. That is to say the 1992 constitution has provided a solid mechanism for political discrimination, recrimination and exclusion of others who may not be loyal to the leader and who may sabotage the business of government. It would however be shallow and a mistake to assume that the constitution of Ghana has given society a Winner-Takes-All mechanism in a change of government. The constitution provides for multiparty democracy, a parliament system with checks and balances.

The constitution is heavy on civil liberties and the rights of the people and therefore cannot accuse the same document to be promoting social exclusion, discrimination and recrimination as alleged by Gyampo (2015, p. 41).

The practice of Winner-Takes-All politics in Ghana is not completely prescriptive but emerged out of the bastardization of political reasoning, out of partisan misinterpretation of public policy driven mostly by ethnicity and politics of identity. As a collective, Ghanaians do not know how to work together to solve common problems. The fact that the 1992 Constitution promotes multiparty democracy is evidence that the constitution never envisioned a Winner-Takes-All practice in national politics but only to the extent that the new President and his team would be men and women that are synchronized to achieve the political agenda of government. The cause for such unfortunate position on the constitution may be due to the lack of legal education among Ghana's parliamentarians (Norman, 2017). One thing is for sure, when it comes to monopolizing state resources for distribution to party members and their supporters and to victimize the opponents, such parochial approach to democracy is due to the lack of real and actual political and legal education (Norman, 2017; Gyampo, 2010). It is also due to the fact that the judiciary is weak and even partisan.

E. Patrimonialism and Neopatrimonialism dimensions of Adversarial Politics

In writing about neopatrimonialism as a feature of Ghana's politics, Bentil and Aidoo (2018) appear to suggest that such a situation exists due to the very competitive nature of contesting for political position which they label as adversarial politics. In their paper, "*The Negative Implications of Adversarialism and Politics of Insults in Ghana: An Overview*" states that adversarial politics is when "the proposals put forward by the government are routinely criticized by opposition party (ibid, p. 8). The mere criticism of government proposal should not lead to the conclusion that the opposition is somehow evil. Similar articulations of Adversarialism in politics were used to support their analysis with works from Gyima-Boadi and Mattes (2001) emphasizing that "opposite opinion to that of other (usually not in Government) takes the opposite position with what the government is trying to do, "for political expediency (...) blatantly oppose such views in the open". Open discussion and opposition of government policy is a healthy sign of a maturing democracy. Gilbert and Aidoo's submission boils down to the assumption that the opposition is motivated by the absence of rational thinking or reasoning and, they are essentially, stupid. There is not a satisfactory definition and explanation of Adversarialism inherent in competitive politics. Mattes and Gyimah-Boadi (2001) also define it as "a source of crossness", because "inherently, it involves dishonesty and at times, absolute deception" in the context of Ghana or African political landscape. This definition reveals the broken morality of Ghana's political class or those of Africa. The legal system in Ghana is based on adversarial approaches which has consistently being used to deliver justice, restore hope of people pursuing criminal justice or equity in civil cases. If adversarialism is not working at an optimal level in Ghana's political system, it is perhaps, due to the absence of a capable guardian (arbiter) in the political and electioneering processes. That is to say, the nation's Electoral Commission with the citizens as the ultimate jury lack the ability to select the best candidate on the basis of development programs that can be realistically implemented. That is also to say that democracy is still in its infancy in Ghana's adversarial political system.

F. Effects of Patrimonialism, Adversarialism, Winner-takes-All, Neopatrimonialism, (PAWN) on Victims of the Political Business Cycles

It would be interesting for mental health epidemiologists to combine with political scientists to assess the uptick of mental health cases that occur in Ghana within the first one hundred days of the political business cycle of a new administration of PAWN victims. The implementation of the political business cycle from one administration to the next has many PAWN casualties due to the brutal manner with which the in-coming administration does its system's and community entries and, how the out-going administration personnel are ousted, removed or demoted from their previous positions into a new status of, in some cases, nonentity, persona non grata and even barred from offices and buildings where, hitherto fore, were their playgrounds. A change of government is not a sudden on-set event. It is a constitutionally scripted event that every citizen ought to be aware of as part of core competence of responsible citizens. This is, therefore, almost childish to make the case that, the change can be or is brutal. However, there have been situations where the changes that occur within the first one hundred days in certain ministries, departments and agencies, have raised serious concerns about the rule of law, and the absence of humanitarian proclivities of the Ghanaian politician.

A case in point was when President Kufuor/NPP assumed the reins of government in 2000. His office dispatched a letter within a short while to the offices of the National Disaster Management Organization; NADMO to remove the then Chief Executive Officer, Mr. Kofi Portuphy from office the same day. In that letter he was ordered "to proceed on leave". Mr. Portuphy is an avowed NDC operative and subsequently the party's Chairman. He was succeeded by Brigadier General (retired) Joseph Odei/NPP.

Like a common laborer, Mr. Portuphy packed a few personal belongings, and left the office without a proper, professional handing over to the in-coming CEO, Brigadier General Odei. In 2009 when President Atta-Mills/NDC succeeded Kufuor, his office retaliated in equal measure which was expected, by appointing Kofi Portuphy/NDC to take over from DCOP Akrofi Asiedu/NPP on similar removal procedure at the NADMO headquarters. Such playground skirmishes could have been avoided if the two political parties, namely NPP and NDC showed maturity, decorum and forgiveness. While those two leaders felt they were protecting their party's image, the real damage was to whatever "*esprit de corps*" that the organization had. The esteem of every organization emanates from the esteem the public holds for that organization. In Ghana, the esteem of NADMO is very low, because it appears, NADMO does not have a high esteem as an entity. Such events create a crisis of identity. In a recent paper, "*Identity Politics in Ghana*" (2023, p. 55) the following quotation which is germane to the issue of mental health as well as the public health of the political class in Ghana, who may be caught in the cleavages that develop between the political parties as natural consequences of the political business cycle is thus:

Erikson's theory on identity crisis maintains that "one cannot separate the identity crisis in individual life and contemporary crisis in historical development because the two help to define each other and are truly relative to each other (Erikson, 1968, p. 23).

By 'crisis' he meant 'opportunity'. Consistent with this viewpoint, it has been noted that, to do justice to the discussion of political party identity matters, one has to approach the issue from intersectional angle and also assess the conduct of the personalities and groups making up that unit of analyses. Such an approach would help to demonstrate the on-going (hate) drive of the NDC and NPP, which the political parties may not even be aware of the potentially harmful consequences of their actions on nationalism and their members.

In Ghanaian political life, it seems considerations for "categorical imperative" or that we are each other's keeper, that we owe duty of care, beneficence, and "no harm theory" from whatever we do, are not part of the routine approximation of virtue, human rights or communitarianism. The utility of an action is measured not by the generalities of the reaction of the population to the conduct, but the singular shallow responses from party members. It is quite easy to witness several political friends going through such treatment by the opposition party and who turn around to display diverse and clear mental health sequelae including excessive alcohol intake, inter-spousal violence, general neglect of parental responsibility, the initiation of new sexual relationships with young women, which under normal circumstances such men would not be caught publicly in such dalliances.

Again, in a 2015 paper on Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and corruption, the author's investigated whether corruption is an artifact of PTSD, and under the title: "*Does Corruption Manifest Post Traumatic Stress Disorder?*" They stated among other submissions that,

The scientific literature is explicit in supporting the theory that those who experience severe economic shocks and stresses over time are more likely to experience PTSD. Also, that fear and ego may be artifacts of exposure to prolonged socio-economic trauma. As a coping mechanism, such persons may engage in rent seeking practices as ways of building personal slush fund against economic uncertainties: shocks and Stresses. It may also be ill-conceived means of improving personal sense of security and resilience against future but similar economic shocks and stresses. Bad economic conditions of a nation even in peace time can mimic wartime situations. Political economies that appear to be in a constant state of agitation and upheaval can be a traumatizing ecosystem that may produce psychosis similar to PTSD, although such conditions are modifiable over time. Considering the systemic challenges and pressures on the national economy, it appears there may be more nationals experiencing PTSD than it is normally understood, due to the persistent poor performance of the national economy. If such is the case, then rent-seeking behaviors and corrupt practices in Ghana are poised to get worse and more mainstream than it has been previously observed (Norman & Aviiisah, 2015, p. 12).

It is entirely possible that there is a nexus between the separation of personnel from their status and previous jobs due to the natural and constitutional operation of the political business cycle and the rate of corrupt activities within the year of political change which needs to be subjected to empirical assessment for validation (Harder *et al.*, 2012, p. 64-66). It is possible for individuals to rationally choose to be bad and undermine the in-coming administration if, they also conclude that, they would not be treated with dignity and respect. "Self-esteem arises out of esteem by others" (Fukuyama, 2018). "Because human beings naturally crave recognition, the modern sense of identity evolves quickly into identity politics, in which individuals demand public recognition of their worth" (Fukuyama, 2018, p. 18, *as cited in* Norman, 2023, p. 56).

"Identity politics has deleterious effect on nationalism and patriotism because it promotes bigoted group interests over the national interests and disincentivises volunteerism, altruism and the pursuit of supererogational initiatives" (Norman, 2023, p. 56-57). Francis Fukuyama's thesis in his book, "*Identity: The Demand for Dignity and Politics of Presentment*", (2018), talks about the apparent decay of American institutions due to the fact that major parts of these institutions have been "progressively captured by powerful interest groups and locked into a rigid structure that (is) unable to reform itself" (Fukuyama, 2018,

p. 6, as cited in Norman, 2023, pp. 55-58). This is no different from the rigid structure which both the NDC and NPP have created for Ghana.

Though Fukuyama was speaking about American society, probably more specifically during the administration of Donald Trump, it resonant with Ghana's political portraiture under both the NDC and NPP governments but more under the NPP's Akufo Addo's administration, in terms of the systematic destruction of nationalism in favor of tribal identity politics. This is because of the undue attention these two political parties pay to special interest groups, issues of consanguinity and the doling of opportunities and contracts to affiliates and associates, including ex-lovers. Ghana is also guilty of "populist nationalism", where "the leaders seek to use the legitimacy conferred by democratic elections to consolidate power", "by claiming direct charismatic connection to the people, who are often defined in a narrow ethnic terms (of being either Ewe, during J. J. Rawlings' NDC administration; Ashanti, during J. A. Kufuor's NPP; Gonja, during John D. Mahama's NDC administration or, Akyem during Akufo Addo's NPP administrations respectively) that exclude big parts of the collective nation (Fukuyama, 2018, p. 7, as cited in Norman, 2023).

V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

Although all new administrations spend so much energy within the first one hundred days or more to install government machinery and personnel, it appears apart from the Presidency making critical appointments to essential national assets, Presidents in Ghana do not spend sufficient amount of time on answering questions of national development. Their first one hundred days are often not marked by defining investment no matter the form, be it legislation, pro-poor programs, pro-youth programs, pro-farmer, or home-owner programs and even universal programs with lasting applications. Whatever development agenda they try to prosecute in the course of their Presidency, ends up in a few years in tatters. The Livelihood Empower Against Poverty program, LEAP was the flagship program of the Kufuor/NPP administration and so was the National Health Insurance Scheme, both of which programs today, do not live up to the original vision that mandated their establishment. At the Local Government level, the LEAP program has become a derisive program that carries very little social acceptance and respect. The NHIS is now regarded as a redundant, insignificant institution for the promotion of public health administration because it is poorly managed and in debt to the providers of healthcare services in the nation. The NHIS is now the center of recruitment for party rejects and followers, it is alleged, where a review of the qualifications of the majority of the staff and personnel would show that most should not be working in that institution despite the intersectionalism of public health and the nature of healthcare delivery system in Ghana. Some members of the management are reported to be on cloud nine, traveling around the nation and the world on high per diems or in search of rent-seeking private ventures within the remit of the official operations of the NHIS. After such expensive trips, they produce no feedback to the organization by way of training the staff in what they learned on their trips such as specifically designed Continuous Professional Development programs on health systems management, health promotion, and emergency health preparedness and so on. On April 18, 2023, the Minister of Health, Kwaku Agyemang Manu, under whose ministry the NHIS falls, expressed his dissatisfaction with the National Health Insurance Scheme, where he accused the Service of extortion. Private providers in cahoots with some in strategic positions present bloated invoices which are paid with speed (because the system of vetting claims is deliberately made porous) so that the insider would receive his or her cut. The Health Minister cited his own experiences that, "I pay when I go to Ridge Hospital. I pay when I go to University of Ghana Medical Center, UGMC. I don't even present my (NHIS) insurance card" (Agyemang Manu, personal communications, 2023). Why is that? Because he knows it would be rejected with disrespect. Over the years the NHIS has become, to a significant degree, a salary collection point for many of the staff, who only stand and wait, who sit all day in their offices browsing on the Internet just to keep busy, as their supervisors dance circles around them and ignore them in routine job assignment. These personnel still get paid because their mere presence at the office, like it is in many private fiefdoms within the various government institutions, is considered performance enough for the purposes of collecting their monthly salaries. Such outcomes are some of the poisoned fruits of patrimonialism, where employees are recruited for a critical organization like the NHIS on political patronage and tribal affiliations.

Patrimonialism was meant to be an enabler for better relationship between the ruled and the ruler, between the subordinate and the supervisor, within a system of checks and balances but that too has been bastardized by the system and the actors in the system.

Winner-Takes-All politics was not meant to be an exclusionary approach to politics, but a means where competitive politics would receive a new impetus every four years, to energize the economic affairs of the nation and drive it into prosperity. It was never meant to promote State capture, and re-distribution of wealth on ethnic, political and identity grounds, but on the basis of pragmatism and meritocracy. Recall what the Center for Democratic Development; CDD said about the cost of running a Presidential and Parliamentary election and link that back to reciprocity's expectations from patrimonialism and even neopatrimonialism

between the ruler and the ruled. The concept of patrimonialism in the modern Ghanaian political discourse requires that it is discussed contextually within the associated expenditures of electioneering cost-burden on political parties, particularly in the absence of significant State financing of political party elections. The pragmatic side of patrimonialism as practiced in the corridors of political party in government offices is that it is not an abstract or a providential development. Each important job position or appointment is carefully commoditized, then monetized, and with a weighted value, which is denominated in thousands of Ghana Cedis and offered to the highest bidder. The economic bar to campaign financing is high, but it has graduated levels, where even the least financially capable person can pay his or her widow's might.

If we go by the study of the Center for Democratic Development, CDD that puts the cost of presidential campaign in Ghana at US\$100 million or (GHC1,200,000,000), while parliamentary campaign costs US\$693,000 or (GHC8,316,000) as of 2022, the winning political party has to adopt the Winner-Takes-All approach in order to appease those citizens, whether they are from the winning party or not, that pre-financed the political campaign with rewarding appointments, contracts and position so that they could recoup the money invested in the campaign (<https://citinewsroom.com-2022/02>). It has to be recalled that not all well-staged political campaigns win the privilege to form a government. The average presidential candidate in Ghana even at conservative calculation would need not less than 12,000 capable contributors to give up GHC 100,000.00 each in order to make up the total needs of GHC1.2 billion to finance the elections. Democracy has never been a cheap proposition in any nation, let alone in a nation where the democratization processes have become political theater in the public square. Thus, if a supporter gives, let say, GHC 300,000.00 in contribution to a party that wins the presidential elections, does such a person deserve to be "appointed" as Chief Executive Officer of a bank and at a potential salary of GHC 70,000.00 a month before taxes?

If patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism are approached from the point of view of pragmatism, it appears, the government in power may be treated with more charity than not. The government in power ought to satisfy the needs of those financial underwriters that provided the needed funds to prosecute the elections. They also need to find a balance to apply egalitarian and democratic principles in the apportionment of jobs as a matter of general operating principle but not to monopolize all of the important jobs and positions to his family and friends and political supporters because they were there for him when contesting for the office. No one compelled any person to run for the presidency and to campaign, and therefore kills any justification that the rest of the public were not there for him and therefore they can be ignored.

The example of patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism displayed during President Akufo Addo's presidency by giving so many critical positions to his family and friends, to people from his Akyem ethnicity, and on the consanguine basis, a conduct that has earned him the moniker as the "most despotic" President in the history of Africa, is a negative outlier. A good mixture of appeasement of financiers and unrelated citizens is the preferred moral ethos from any fair-minded President as was the case of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah. He ensured all and sundry that, as Ghanaians both the children of his political party members and key actors of his Convention People's Party, CPP had the same access to scholarship, university education, military service and other security services, bureaucratic jobs, and other economic opportunities as even the children from the opposition and those who were not aligned with any political party. Extreme cases of patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism that was witnessed under President Akufo Addo's government may have contributed to an uptick of mental health cases, though the jury is still out with the evidence.

As has already been discussed, economic shocks and stressors can contribute to mental health issues, including perhaps, post-traumatic stress disorders resulting in increased cases of suicide, spousal abuse, domestic violence, child defilement, and other sequelae. The "thrill of victory and the agony of defeat" have many sides, as shown in this work. The better way to moderate such outcomes has many prongs: the researchers have to contextually analyze the phenomenon of patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism within each national ecosystem and how things work in that system from the point of view of politics and economics. The political parties lack research divisions that don't only analyze the conduct of the opposition but also can-do deep analysis of policies, strategies and tactics of their own parties.

Considering the findings of Harder *et al.* (2012) after sampling 552 improvised youth through random sampling, six months after post-election violence in Kenya, with some 18% having PTSD based on the UCLA PTSD Reaction Index adopted from Steinber *et al.* (2004, p. 64, 68), should be a concern to society. They added that "community and war-like violence occur in even the most politically stable countries in Sub-Saharan Africa". They also found that "as the number of traumatic events occurred so did the incremental up surge of PTSD case. While the Kenya youth study did not find age and sex differences to PTSD, the study provides another kind of documentation on the effects of war like violence within the urban space among even the impoverished youth, which suggests the need for the provision of mental health services in all elections.

If the impoverished youth would show such health status, what about pensioners whose lives' savings and investment may have been captured by central government because it needed extra revenue to finance a well-established case of a bloated government?

A government bloated by creating jobs for the boys and girls, bloated by creating more ministerial positions than there are real jobs for them to perform?

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